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The delegation of Republic of El Salvador defended its position by emphasizing the country’s socioeconomic challenges and the need to prioritize public safety while combating organized crime. Questions from Brazil and the French Republic focused on prison inspections and whether El Salvador would accept international oversight to ensure security and human rights protections. The delegation of Federal Republic of Germany argued that education remains one of the most effective long-term solutions to reduce crime and improve social stability. Germany also stated that it is open to sharing technology and resources with other nations to strengthen crime prevention strategies. Colombia questioned whether such cooperation could play a role in combating organized crime internationally. The United Mexican States stressed that laws must be effectively applied to ensure justice and security. However, both the United States of America and Colombia raised concerns regarding Mexico’s high levels of violence and questioned what further measures would be taken. Finally, the People's Republic of China defended El Salvador, arguing that its policies are aimed at protecting society. Meanwhile, Brazil raised concerns over prolonged emergency measures, questioning how the international community can ensure that states do not use such conditions to justify human rights violations.

The third and final day of proceedings before the International Criminal Court commenced with the defense’s arguments concerning Omar al-Bashir’s role in peacebuilding and conflict management in the Darfur region. The defense emphasized that Sudan had not ratified the Rome Statute. The Council then heard testimony from the fourth witness, Dalia Mohammed, former secretary to Omar al-Bashir. Ms. Mohammed stated that her responsibilities included organizing the defendant’s schedule and meetings. She reported direct communication between the defendant and certain military officials, occasionally through coded language. The witness expressed discomfort in her position, noting that acts of violence in Darfur were frequently reported following meetings between the former president and specific individuals. In response, the prosecution reiterated that Omar al-Bashir was aware of the situation in Darfur and therefore bore responsibility for it. Throughout the session, both parties presented further statements in support of their positions. As proceedings concluded, the prosecution stressed the necessity of holding Omar al-Bashir accountable for his negligence regarding the crisis in Darfur, despite his awareness of ongoing events. Conversely, the defense argued that attributing responsibility to Mr. al-Bashir was unjust, as he had not directly committed the crimes and no evidence directly linked him to them. Following closing arguments from both parties, the judges adjourned to deliberate on sentencing.

The final day of the HUNSC debate on the 1994 Rwandan Genocide proved to be its most productive, culminating in the adoption of a wide-ranging draft resolution co-signed by virtually every delegation in the room. The document, submitted by Belgium, Rwanda, and the United Kingdom as main submitters, addressed the three pillars that had structured the debate throughout the conference: humanitarian assistance, conflict stabilisation, and the prevention of future atrocities. On the humanitarian front, the resolution called upon member states to increase financial, logistical, and material support through UN organs such as the UNHCR, UNICEF, and the WFP, covering essentials ranging from food and clean water to field hospitals and sanitation systems. It also endorsed the creation of refugee camps in neighbouring countries including Zaire, Uganda, Tanzania, and Burundi, to be protected by UN peacekeepers and subject to regular reporting to the Security Council. A new body, the United Nations Funding Union for East Africa (UNFUEA), was established to coordinate humanitarian and reconstruction efforts across the region, with transparency ensured through yearly reporting. In terms of accountability and stabilisation, the resolution created the International Court of East Africa (ICEA) to investigate individuals linked to organised crime and mass atrocities within Rwanda and neighbouring states. It also called for a strengthening of UNAMIR, expanding its personnel from 200 to 5,000 troops and reforming its rules of engagement to allow for enhanced civilian protection. An arms embargo on militias and discriminatory armed organisations was likewise endorsed. Perhaps the most forward-looking dimension of the resolution concerned prevention. Delegates agreed to establish a standing early-warning unit within the Security Council, empowered to bypass normal scheduling given the urgency of its mandate. Member states were called upon to share intelligence on armed groups, ethnic violence, and hate propaganda. The resolution also created the East African Media Term of Commitment (EAMTOC) to monitor and limit the spread of extremist content across borders, setting a four-month deadline for Rwanda to bring state-owned media, including the notorious RTLM, under control. Educational reform, genocide memorials, and the gradual elimination of ethnic classification in official documentation rounded out a resolution remarkable in both its scope and its ambition. The seventh session thus concluded on a note of cautious optimism. Whether such a resolution could have made a difference in 1994 remains a sobering question, but the delegates' willingness to engage seriously with both the failures of the past and the responsibilities of the present suggested that the exercise had been anything but merely academic. The eighth and final session, it must be noted, took a rather lighter turn: with the resolution already adopted, the chair entertained the room with impromptu games and questions, until order was swiftly restored.

Today began with a motion from the delegate of Guatemala addressed to the Chairs, requesting permission to hold an unmoderated caucus to work on the third working paper, with the goal of finding a feasible solution that satisfies all Member States regarding the effective fight against online misogyny. The proposal to combat online misogyny is a joint effort aimed at mitigating gender-based violence in the digital environment, driven by debates and resolutions with strong participation from countries such as Brazil, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, and Peru. The guidelines focus on holding platforms accountable, promoting digital education, and criminalizing misogynistic conduct. The discussion has expanded to the international arena, where coordination between Latin America and the Caribbean has proven essential for the creation of unified legal standards. One of the key milestones of this cooperation is the application of the principles of the Inter-American Model Law on Violence against Women in Digital Spaces, which serves as a guideline for sovereign States to update their national legislation. At the same time, global forums, under the auspices of the United Nations and mechanisms such as the Global Digital Compact, argue that women’s safety online cannot depend on the goodwill of private corporations. The central goal of these international coalitions is to compel countries to recognize gender-based cyberviolence as a serious human rights violation, demanding regulations that curb the use of algorithms designed to profit from engagement generated by hate speech. During the unmoderated debate among delegates, it was stated that for these international guidelines to be effective, the enforcement of strict legal and punitive measures must become the operational pillar of the strategy. The main focus is on holding large technology companies legally accountable, demanding greater transparency in content moderation systems and independent audits regarding the spread of harmful content. In the criminal justice system, there is a call to directly criminalize misogyny, equating it with crimes of discrimination and racism. This involves criminalizing specific behaviors, such as coordinated harassment and doxxing, systematic defamation, and threats of physical or sexual violence, ensuring that perpetrators face severe criminal and financial penalties, thereby eliminating the sense of anonymity and impunity that has historically prevailed on social media. However, the delegates emphasized that punishment alone does not break the cycle of violence, making investment in protection and education essential. Immediate protection requires the establishment of efficient reporting channels directly integrated with platforms and law enforcement authorities, as well as the creation of specialized psychosocial and legal support networks for victims. In the long term, prevention relies on digital literacy and basic education. Public awareness campaigns and the inclusion of discussions on digital citizenship in school curricula are vital tools for teaching new generations to identify, reject, and report misogynistic behavior, thereby eroding the culture of tolerance for online abuse starting in childhood. Finally, the delegates reached a consensus that the need to implement this rapid-response ecosystem is supported by alarming data and the profound social impact of digital violence. Global statistics indicate that approximately 38% of women worldwide have been direct targets of cyberattacks. The impact goes beyond individual psychological suffering: it silences women’s voices in public debate, leading to self-censorship among journalists, female politicians, and activists, which undermines democracy itself. Furthermore, modern strategies recognize that online misogyny operates in an intersectional manner. Black women, Indigenous women, women from ethnic minorities, and women from the LGBTQIA+ community suffer significantly more brutal and frequent attacks, which requires that public policies and defense mechanisms be designed to prioritize the protection of the populations most vulnerable to this intersectional violence.

The debate concluded.

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On the last day of HUMUNITED in the UNEP, the delegates continued the previously opened speaker list. The delegations of Maldives and New Zealand supported a gradual energy transition. The delegation of Fiji suggested support from corporations in order to develop more technologies and increase investment in the hope of environmental protection. All delegates agreed on a gradual transition from oil and non-renewable energy sources to a sustainable energy model; however, the delegates discussed whether the first countries to be helped should be the emerging countries or the developed ones. Before the delegates could discuss further, the session was interrupted by a sudden crisis: Petrobras (Brazil), PDVSA (Venezuela), ExxonMobil (United States of America), and Shell bought land illegally from Indigenous peoples in Venezuela, Guyana, and Suriname. In this incident, in addition to the Indigenous peoples being expelled from their own land, 15 of them died in this episode. Furthermore, economists pointed out that this event was supported by American financial institutions for the exploitation of Indigenous lands. Brazil condemned the incident and called for reparations to the Indigenous populations and the countries affected by the incident. Denmark supported penalties for every country that caused the crisis and stated that for an efficient energy transition, those countries needed to face consequences.The delegates united to create a working paper, in which an investigation by the USA was to be made to ensure whether their government had involvement or not. Afterwards, those involved would have to deal with consequences such as indemnification and the freezing or suspension of the licenses of those companies. A project of support donations and annual fiscalization would also be made. The working paper passed.The draft resolution was finally presented, addressing sovereignty, support to underdeveloped countries, environmental and ecosystem security and regulation, and energy transition, and passed unanimously.

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